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REFORM IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: 
THE CASE OF MEDICARE 
by Allen J. Matusow 
In 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson exploited a favorable moment to 
push through Congress most of the liberal reform proposals of the previous 
twenty years. The first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, "the greatest in 
American history" according to the President, enacted Medicare for old peo- 
ple, Medicaid for poor people, school aid for disadvantaged children, a voting 
rights bill for disfranchised Southern blacks, rent supplements for low income 
families, economic assistance for Appalachia, increased funds for the new 
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), and much else of importance. John- 
son told Congress in October 1965, "you have begun a march which will not be 
stopped."' But in fact the liberal hour was already over. The programs of the 
Great Society, greeted at first with enthusiastic public applause, would quickly 
become engulfed in controversy, lose popular support, and largely be repudi- 
ated by the new administration elected in 1968. 
In part the Great Society was the victim of unfortunate historical circum- 
stances, a casualty of ghetto rebellion and war inVietnam. But the major cause 
of the failure of the Great Society lay in the conceptions that shaped it. Great 
Society reforms were so conservative in their design and execution that they 
were bound to disappoint the reformist hopes invested in them. The conserva- 
tive limits imposed on Johnson's programs had two causes. First, post-war 
liberalism had developed complacent assumptions about the American social 
order and would not seriously contemplate redistribution of wealth and power. 
Second, Johnson's passion for consensus, which paid such handsome divi- 
dends in the 1964 election, meant that whatever hedid for the weak wouldhave 
to be acceptable to the strong. 
The war on poverty was the main component of the Great Society. A serious 
strategy for this war would have set a minimum floor under the income of the 
unemployable poor, created government jobs for the employable poor, and 
sought to reform the repressive and unresponsive institutions controlling the 
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lives of poor people. But warfare on this scale would have increased taxes on 
the affluent, risked inflation, and aroused the enmity of entrenched and 
powerful special interests. Though varieties of this strategy won favor at 
times in the OEO, they never had a chance in the White House. The 
administration's poverty war was only an uncoordinated collection of pallia- 
tives, whose effects were often of doubtful social value. 
If the Great Society had one overriding flaw stemming from its conserva- 
tive premises, it was this: it chose as the instruments of reform the very 
institutions that had failed the poor. School systems notoriously indifferent 
to culturally disadvantaged children received billions to combat the educa- 
tional effects of poverty. The private home-building industry, never noted 
for altruism, was enlisted to help supply housing for low income families. The 
local community action agencies created by the OEO quickly abandoned 
agitation for institutional reform and became mere conduits for dispensing 
social services through traditional welfare bureaucracies. And in the case of 
Medicare-Medicaid, the government intervened in the medical market place 
with billions of dollars without requiring any changes in the existing health 
care industry. 
The case of Medicare-Medicaid can serve to illustrate the general limits 
of Johnsonian reform. Of all Great Society programs, the Medicare part of 
this measure was the most popular, expensive, and important; and since it 
provided undoubted benefits to many, it remains the most defensible. Never- 
theless, Medicare, along with Medicaid, had some unintended and largely 
unrecognized consequences that make even it something less than an unam- 
biguous boon to the general welfare. In choosing a conservative strategy to 
pay the medical expenses of part of the population, the reformers of the 
mid-1960's created almost as many problems as they solved. 
The Medicare bill submitted by Johnson to Congress in 1965 had a long 
and interesting hi~tory .~  After World War I1 President Truman had proposed 
compulsory comprehensive medical insurance for every citizen, to be fi- 
nanced primarily by a payroll tax on employers and employees. The Ameri- 
can Medical Association (AMA) spent millions to discredit Truman's plan, 
and in 1949 a conservative coalition in Congress easily defeated it. In 1957 
the issue resurfaced in drastically refashioned form. Liberals now proposed 
compulsory government health insurance only for persons 65 or over. Bene- 
fits would cover only hospital-related costs. And financing would be tied 
directly to the existing social security mechanism. Called Medicare, this 
proposal predictably won the support of liberals and Northern Democrats, 
while repelling Republicans and the organized doctors. 
The design of the new program proved politically shrewd. In selecting old 
people for Medicare's benefits, liberals hit on a popular minority demon- 
strably in need of hospital insurance. In limiting coverage to hospital costs, 
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Medicare seemed a cautious rather than a radical innovation. And, liberals 
argued, linking Medicare to social security made Medicare not charity dis- 
pensed after imposing a means test, but a form of insurance entitling all 
contributors to benefits as a matter of right. In making this last argument, 
the liberals were exploiting a popular misconception. Social security was not 
really insurance, and neither was Medicare. Workers paying social security 
taxes were not contributing to their own benefits but to benefits for the 
already retired. (For years after Medicare's enactment, its actual benefi- 
ciaries had paid hardly any taxes into the program.) Social Security pensions 
and Medicare were income redistribution mechanisms which transferred 
wealth from the young to the old, rather than from the rich to the poor. Social 
security taxes were, in fact, sharply regressive, a disproportionate share of 
their burden falling on low income groups. Nevertheless, the social security 
feature of Medicare was one of the big reasons for its undoubted popular 
appeal. 
Conservatives reacted as violently to the new Medicare proposal as they 
had to Truman's national health insurance scheme. They complained that 
it augmented the power of Washington bureaucrats, diminished individual 
liberty by making participation compulsory, and prepared the way for social- 
ized medicine. To weaken the liberal case for Medicare, Congressional con- 
servatives in 1960 devised an alternative solution to the problem of burden- 
some medical costs of the aged. This was the Kerr-Mills program, passed that 
year and named after its sponsors, Representative Wilbur Mills and Senator 
Robert Kerr. Kerr-Mills increased federal aid to help the states pay for the 
medical care of old people on public assistance. More important, it initiated 
a new program of federal matching grants to any state undertaking to assist 
a new class of Americans-the "medically indigent" aged. The medically 
indigent were defined as those with incomes too high to qualify for public 
assistance but too low to pay their medical bills. (The concept of medical 
indigency would later profoundly shape Medicaid.) Kerr-Mills perfectly fit 
the ideological requirements of contemporary conservatism, The program 
was to be administered by the states; it removed the element of compulsion; 
and it imposed a means test to make sure that only the needy obtained 
benefits. 
Kerr-Mills did not quiet agitation for Medicare. President Kennedy had 
campaigned for it in 1960 and pressed Congress to enact it throughout his 
abbreviated tenure. Kennedy's case was immeasurably strengthened by the 
poor performance of the Kerr-Mills program. Only twenty-eight states had 
enacted programs for the medically indigent aged by 1963, and five rich 
states were receiving nearly all the act's benefik3 But Kennedy failed to 
convert Congress to Medicare. The key Congressional obstacle was the 
House Committee on Ways and Means, whose majority was solidly opposed 
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to medicare and whose chairman was Wilbur Mills. When the Senate finally 
passed Medicare in 1964, even President Johnson could not persuade Mills 
to dislodge the bill from his House committee. Then came Johnson's land- 
slide election victory in November, bringing into the House thirty-eight new 
liberal Democrats and assuring Medicare's triumph at the next Congressio- 
nal session. 
In testifying for Medicare before Ways and Means in early 1965, Anthony 
Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), added 
little to arguments that had been refined through nearly a decade of debate. 
The average person 65 years or over, Celebrezze had pointed out many times, 
had only half the income of younger Americans, but used hospitals three 
times more frequently. Probably fewer than one million of the nation's 
nineteen million old people had insurance covering as much as 40% of 
average medical costs, and eight million had no insurance at all. Medicare, 
said Celebrezze, was necessary to prevent "personal bankruptcy, unwilling 
dependency, . . . and loss of pride" among the nation's aged population.4 
The basic provisions of the administration's Medicare bill committed the 
government to pay for most of the hospital-related charges incurred by the 
aged: hospital rooms, nursing care, and other hospital services. This bill 
covered neither physicians'nor surgical fees. To discourage doctors from 
unnecessarily keeping aged patients in hospitals, the bill provided coverage 
for certain economical substitutes for hospitalization: post-hospital care in 
nursing homes, house visits by nurses and therapists, and out-patient di- 
agnostic services such as x-rays and lab tests. For the one person in six who 
was not eligible for social security benefits the bill offered identical coverage 
paid for from general federal revenues: 
Faced with imminent passage of the Medicare bill early in 1965, the AMA 
and the Republicans executed a major change in tactics. The trouble with 
Medicare, they now said, was that it did not go far enough. Testifying be- 
fore Congress in February, the president of the AMA noted estimates that 
Medicare "would cover only 25% of the annual health care expenses of the 
average person over 65." Where, he asked, "are the needy aged to get the 
other 75%?"6 The Republicans submitted a substitute to meet Medicare's 
alleged deficiencies. It provided voluntary federal insurance to cover not 
only hospital-related costs, but also physicians' and surgical fees and drug 
costs. Beneficiaries of this insurance would pay half the premiums; the 
government would pay the other half from general revenues? The Republi- 
cans sought to achieve two purposes with this proposal: reap political gain 
by offering more coverage than the Democrats; and maintain ideological 
purity by sponsoring a voluntary program. 
The central figure in the curious history of Medicare in 1965 was Wilbur 
Mills. A consummate politician who valued consensus within his commit- 
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tee, Mills could read the election returns as well as any man. Mills an- 
nounced early in the year that he now supported Medicare and would see 
to it that Ways and Means soon reported a bill to the House floor. On 
March 2, 1965, Mills's committee met with officials from HEW in execu- 
tive session to work out details of the legislation. In the midst of a spirited 
discussion on the Republican substitute, Mills unexpectedly made a sug- 
gestion. Why not combine the administration and Republican bills into 
one? he asked. As Mills described it, Medicare would have two tiers. The 
first would be compulsory hospital insurance financed primarily by social 
security taxes. The second would be voluntary insurance for the aged cov- 
ering physicians' and surgical fees and certain other medical charges. The 
government and the beneficiaries would share equally in the cost of the 
voluntary insurance program. Mills turned to Wilbur Cohen, Assistant 
Secretary of HEW, and asked if the administration would consent to add- 
ing supplementary voluntary insurance to its bill. Cohen readily gave his 
approval, and that same evening, so did President Johnson. Cohen recalled 
later, "It was the most brilliant legislative move I'd seen in thirty years. 
The doctors couldn't complain, because they had been carping about 
Medicare's shortcomings and about its being compulsory. And the Repub- 
licans couldn't complain, because it was their own idea. In effect, Mills 
had taken the A.M.A.'s ammunition, put it in the Republicans' gun, and 
blown both of them off the map."' Embarrassed by Mills's maneuver, the 
Republicans wound up opposing a bill that included their own proposal. 
Mills was not done yet. Medicare would obviousIy leave the Kerr-Mills 
program with a much diminished role in paying the medical bills of the 
elderly poor. Rather than abandon a program bearing his name, Mills decid- 
ed to add an expanded version of Kerr-Mills as the third tier of his 
committee's bill. Mills offered federal aid to states which would make medi- 
cal payments for certain categories of the poor and medically indigent below 
the age of 65. This became the program popularly known as Medicaid. 
Medicaid could potentially assist millions of the non-aged poor and near- 
poor in paying their medical bills. It might one day even reach more people 
and cost more money than Medicare itself. Surprisingly, few paid much 
attention in 1965 to this major innovation in the nation's public assistance 
program. 
By the time the bill left Ways and Means, the administration's original 
proposal had been drastically r e ~ i s e d . ~  Wilbur Mills, once a conservative foe 
of federal involvement in medicine, had drafted a measure that went far 
beyond anything Lyndon Johnson had dared contemplate in January. 
Mills's confection survived largely intact all the hurdles of the House and 
Senate. On July 30, 1965, Johnson flew to Independence, Missouri, to sign 
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the bill in the presence of Harry Truman. The new law added two titles to 
the Social Security Act of 1935:1° 
Title 18. Part A of Medicare provided federal hospital benefits for up to ninety days for each 
spell of illness for an aged person, The patient would have to pay a deductible of $40 for the 
first sixty days and $10 a day for the next thirty days. Post-hospital patients were entitled to 
one hundred days of nursing home care; outpatient diagnostic services, for which patients paid 
the first $20 and 20% of remaining costs; and up to a hundred home health care visits by nurses 
and therapists after discharge from a hospital. Part B of Medicare created volunfary supplemen- 
tal insurance to cover physicians' and surgical fees. Enrollees would pay $3 a month, and the 
federal government would pay a matching amount. This insurance covered 80% of doctors' fees 
after an annual deduction of $50. Covered also were x-rays, lab tests, ambulance service and 
certain optometrist fees. 
Title 19. This title established Medicaid. First, it codified and liberalized medical payments 
for the four categories of federally-aided public assistance recipients: the indigent aged, blind, 
totally and permanently disabled, and members of families with dependent children. Second, 
states were now offered the option of extending medical payments to include those of the aged, 
blind, disabled, and families with dependent children not eligible for public assistance but 
nevertheless medically indigent. The federal government offered to pay grants to the states 
varying from 50% to 83% depending on the wealth of a state, as the federal share of the cost 
of these two programs. A state's Medicaid program at a minimum had to cover the costs of 
hospitals, physicians, nursing homes, x-rays, and lab tests. 
Without doubt, Medicare-Medicaid affected more people and cost more 
money than any other single welfare program since the New Deal. Under 
Medicare nearly all aged persons in the country qualified for the 
government's hospitalization benefits, and 96% of them elected to buy the 
supplementary insurance as well, Government expenditures for Medicare 
quickly outstripped the government's estimates, rising from $3.4 billion in 
the program's first year (fiscal 1967) to $7.9 billion in fiscal 197 1." Medicaid 
caught on much more slowly, since its implementation depended on the 
initiative of the states. In fiscal 1967 more than four million people received 
the benefits of Medicare at a cost of $2.4 billion. By 1971 the estimated 
number of beneficiaries had grown to more than thirteen million, and the 
cost to $6.4 billion.'* Thus by 1971 federal and state governments were 
spending over $14 billion a year to help pay the medical expenses of one- 
seventh of the population. 
Medicare-Medicaid was the quintessential Great Society program. It 
aimed at far-reaching reform without change in existing institutions or chal- 
lenge to vested interests. The government in effect turned the program over 
to the medical profession, paid its fees, and imposed only the feeblest regula- 
tions on it. The government did this despite the notorious inefficiency of 
hospital managers and the spirit of the petite bourgeoisie that permeated 
private medical practice. Though progressive in implementing medical tech- 
nology, the medical profession remained in the hands of individual busi- 
nessmen insistent on being paid a fee for service. It was a business where 
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consumers were ignorant, where practitioners had control over the number 
of potential competitors, and where a tendency to plunder non-profit insur- 
ance providers had long been manifest. Under the law, hospitals were to be 
reimbursed for their reasonable costs and physicians for their customary 
fees, a vague formula with incentives for padding costs and raising fees. The 
House Ways and Means Committee had made explicit the intent of Congress 
not to interfere with the existing structure of the health care industry. The 
Committee's report of March 1965 said, "The bill specifically prohibits the 
Federal Government from exercising supervision or control over the practice 
of medicine, the manner in which services are provided, and the administra- 
tion or operation of medical facilities."13 
There were those, of course, who questioned whether expenditures of 
additional billions for health care was a good idea no matter how the medical 
profession conducted its business. In this view, the growing American taste 
for consuming medical services depended on wild overestimates of what 
these services could accomplish. The improvement in the health of popula- 
tions in modern industrial societies was the result primarily of rising incomes, 
public measures to cleanse the environment, and basic research in bacteriol- 
ogy, physics, and other sciences. The therapeutic medical services rendered 
by physicians and hospitals more often eased symptoms than effected cures, 
and Eli Ginzberg of Columbia University went so far in 1969 as to say, "It 
is just possible that with regard to a wide range of conditions, those who were 
treated least made the best pr~gress."'~ Nevertheless, the American people 
desired more medical service, and they valued equity highly enough to pay 
billions to increase the share consumed by disadvantaged groups. 
By no means all the governmental expenditures for Medicare-Medicaid 
purchased an increase in services. To a large extent, these programs shifted 
the cost of treating charity patients from private sources or local govern- 
ments to the federal government. Hospitals and doctors could now charge 
the government for medical care they had once given free. Medicare made 
it possible for hospitals to reduce the number of non-paying aged patients 
from 17% to 3%.15 Of the $1 billion paid by the government to private 
physicians in fiscal 1968 for Medicare-Medicaid, an estimated $344 million 
simply replaced an equal value of services formerIy rendered at reduced fees 
or no fees at a11.I6 Neither hospitals nor physicians reduced charges to their 
paying patients following this gold strike at the federal Treasury. 
But much of the expenditure for Medicare-Medicaid did make additional 
medical care available to the aged and the poor. Largely because of Medi- 
care, the elderly increased their utilization of medical services by nearly 1 1% 
a year for 1966-1969, a rate three times greater than for the non-aged." 
Increased utilization was especially marked in hospitals, where the number 
of days of care per hundred aged persons increased 25% during Medicare's 
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first year.'* The skeptical doubted whether this increase was medically justifi- 
able. Without incentives to economize on government-financed patients, 
doctors and hospitals proved too ready to commit and retain patients. Wide- 
spread suspicions led the General Accounting Office (GAO), an independent 
auditing agency of Congress, to examine in 1969 the problem of hospital 
utilization under Medicare. GAO investigated the medical records of 1,735 
randomly-selected extended duration Medicare cases. GAO reported, "our 
consulting physicians questioned in 465 cases [27%] whether the care provid- 
ed should have been under the Medicare program."19 A secretary of HEW 
once estimated that if the hospital stay of every Medicare patient were 
decreased by one day, the annual savings to the government would be $400 
The main purpose of Medicare had been to cut the direct medical expend- 
itures of the aged. For those suffering catastrophic illnesses, Medicare was 
everything it was supposed to be. (Thirty-nine percent of Medicare reim- 
bursements in 1967 were for services rendered to the 7.5% of Medicare 
patients with expenses of $2000 or But the average aged person still 
found his limited budget burdened by substantial medical costs. Among the 
expenses which the 1965 Medicare Act did not cover were the first $40 of 
hospital bills, 20% of doctor bills, the first $50 of physicians' fees, drug bills, 
dental bills and optometrist fees. True, the elderly had to pay only 47% of 
their total medical bill out-of-pocket in the first Medicare year, compared 
to 77% previously. But the medical bill of the average aged person rose so 
rapidly that first year that the benefits of Medicare were partially washed 
away. Thus despite Medicare, the actual out-of-pocket expenditures for 
medical services per aged person declined from only $229 in 1965 to $196 
in 1967.22 By 1970, out-of-pocket costs for the aged had gone back up to $226, 
compared to only $100 for the non-aged pers0n.~3 Ironically, an important 
cause of rising medical costs was Medicare-Medicaid itself. 
Medical prices had been rising more rapidly than other consumer prices 
since 1950, but beginning in 1966 the escalation became dramatic. That 
Medicare-Medicaid happened to commence operations in that year was no 
mere coincidence. Economists think of medical services the way they think 
of corn. When demand pushes against supply, prices go up. The huge infu- 
sion of government funds into the medical marketplace after 1965 pre- 
dictably helped raise prices at a rapid rate for all patients. Between 1965 and 
1970 total private and public spending for health in the U.S. increased from 
$39 billion to $67 billion. Medical prices, which rose 2.8% annually from 
1960 to 1966, went up an average 6.6% in each of the first four Medicare 
years. Since the largest proportion of government expenditures went for 
hospital care, hospital prices rose fastest of all-from 7% a year in the first 
half of the decade to about 14% in the second half.24 (Interestingly, while 
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physicians' fees rose 10.9% in Medicare's first year, drug prices, dental fees 
and optometrists' fees, which were not covered, remained virtuzlly un- 
changed.)25 Authorities agree that Medicare-Medicaid contributed signifi- 
cantly to medical inflation, but few economists have ventured precise esti- 
mates of the program's price impact. The one study brave enough to try 
examined medical prices in 1967 and 1968 and concluded that nearly the 
entire rise in hospital and physician prices in these years was attributable to 
Medicare-Medi~aid.~~ Given inflation in the general economy, this finding 
seems exaggerated. One conclusion is, however, unchallengeable. Non-recip- 
ients had not only to pay sizeable taxes to support Medicare-Medicaid; they 
also had to pay significantly higher prices for their own medical care as a 
consequence of this same program. 
The distribution of benefits under the 1965 act was hardly what its spon- 
sors had anticipated. In fiscal year 1968, for instance, non-recipient house- 
holds paid a net average of $1 14 in taxes to support Medicare-Medicaid. The 
net benefit for each Medicare household was $175, and for each Medicaid 
beneficiary, $200. But the real winners in this massive redistribution of 
income were the nation's nearly 200,000 private physicians, whose incomes 
increased an estimated average of about $3900 in 1968 thanks to Medicare- 
Medi~aid.~' Some doctors, of course, did better than others. Sometimes 
through fraud or exploitation of lax regulations, approximately 10,000 doc- 
tors each collected $25,000 or more a year from these programs.28 As one 
study put it, "It is difficult to defend a policy which provided at public 
expense the greatest gains to one of the highest paid  profession^."^^ 
Though Medicare covered all aged persons, the poor were supposed to be 
the chief beneficiaries of the 1965 act. Medicare's proponents had based their 
case mainly on the large number of elderly poor who could not pay their 
medical bills. As it turned out, Medicare left so many costs uncovered that 
medical bills continued to burden the elderly poor. Fortunately, Medicaid 
was often available to filI some of Medicare's gaps. Medicaid, for instance, 
paid 22% of the health bill of the elderly in 1969.30 But Medicaid was exactly 
the kind of state charity, complete with means test, so abhorrent to 
Medicare's creators. Moreover, Medicaid benefits varied widely among the 
states, leaving millions of the aged poor and near-poor to pay many bills as 
best they could.31 
Medicaid's general performance was the cause of much hand-wringing. It 
covered only about one-third of the poor in 1969,32 neglected children in 
favor of the aged, and concentrated its benefits in a handful of rich states. 
California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York, containing less than 
one-quarter of the nation's poverty households, spent nearly two-thirds of 
all Medicaid funds.33 Every state but Arizona and Alaska provided Medicaid 
benefits for welfare recipients, but only half the states provided for the 
106 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
medically indigent. Run by weak and understaffed state welfare agencies, 
the program was an administrative monstrosity preyed upon by often 
unscrupulous doctors.34 Medicaid's most obvious weakness resulted from 
its connection with the despised welfare system. Testifying before Con- 
gress in 1969, Dr. John Knowles, Director of the Massachusetts General 
Hospital, summed up the view of Medicaid's reformist critics. "Medicaid," 
he said, "has degenerated into merely a financing mechanism for the 
existing system of welfare medicine which is not adequate and must be 
changed. . . .It  perpetuates the . . . inhuman and undignified means test 
in the stale atmosphere of charity medicine carried out in many instances 
by marginal practitioners in marginal fa~ilities."~~ In New York City, for 
example, only 15% of eligible doctors consented to treat Medicaid pa- 
tients, and among these were many who specialized in the poor and 
offered second-rate services.36 According to one government report, 
"Medicaid has been forced to pay less than adequate prices for frequent- 
ly less than adequate  service^."^' By 1971 governments were pouring 35% 
of public assistance dollars into Medicaid, a huge proportion anticipated 
by no 0ne.~8 If welfare recipients had received in cash the equivalent of 
the medical payments made in their behalf, they would probably not 
have chosen to spend so much on health. Dissatisfaction with Medicaid 
soon spanned the political spectrum, and everyone agreed that some 
better way had to be found to democratize access to medical services. 
By the early 1970's galloping medical inflation had become a major 
political issue. Ignoring the role which the government's programs had 
already played in creating the crisis, liberals proposed compulsory na- 
tional health insurance as their solution. The prospect of the government 
paying the health bill of every citizen in an uncontrolled medical mar- 
ketplace should have gladdened few informed hearts. The lesson of Medi- 
care-Medicaid is that without reform of existing medical institutions, 
no real solution to the medical payments crisis is possible. How such 
reform can be achieved is a complex and debatable matter. Should 
government pursue policies to increase the number of medical suppliers? 
Should it encourage an increase in the production of para-medics and an 
expansion of their function? Should it directly control medical prices? 
Should it use its tremendous economic leverage to seek replacement of 
fee-for-service with prepaid medical care, perhaps in neighborhood 
Health Maintenance Organizations? Should it own and operate its own 
hospitals? Should it socialize hospitals already in existence? Each of these 
possibilities poses problems of its own. And those that might best achieve 
the purposes of reformers would most offend the free enterprise tradi- 
tions of the country and entrenched special interests in medicine. It 
should not, however, surprise a generation that lived through the Great 
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Society that the world yields grudgingly to mere good will, that cautious 
intervention can distort but not discipline the free market, and that real 
social change entails some measure of social conflict and social cost. 
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